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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samuel Mendenhall filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a pre-sentence mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2522, after he pled guilty to two counts of injury to a child and one count of felon in
possession of a firearm. Mr. Mendenhall asserts the district court erred by summarily dismissing
this claim, as there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s failure to obtain
a § 19-2522 evaluation was a tactical decision. Furthermore, if his counsel’s failure to obtain a
§ 19-2522 evaluation is found not to be a tactical decision, Mr. Mendenhall asserts that he has
shown prejudice, as the absence of a § 19-2522 evaluation rendered his sentencing hearing
presumptively unreliable.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Samuel Mendenhall pled guilty to two counts of injury to a child, and one count of felon
in possession of a firearm. (Ex. 1, p.4, L.4 – p.23, L.5.)1 After the district court accepted
Mr. Mendenhall’s guilty plea, his trial counsel asked the district court to order a psychological
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522; however, the district court stated that it was inclined only
to order a mental health screening pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, and Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel
stated, “[t]hat would be wonderful.” (Ex. 1, p.24, L.2 – p.25, L.15.) Trial counsel indicated that

1

Mr. Mendenhall did not appeal from his judgment of conviction (R., p.6); therefore, transcripts
of his entry of plea and sentencing hearings were not prepared prior to Mr. Mendenhall filing his
petition for post-conviction relief. The State supported its motion for summary dismissal with
State’s Exhibit 1 – a transcript of the entry of plea and sentencing hearings, which is found at
pages 79-93 of the Clerk’s Record. Citations to these transcripts will use the designation “Ex 1”
and will include the more precise page and line numbers contained within the transcript itself,
rather than the page numbers associated with the Clerk’s Record.
1

he believed an evaluation would be useful because Mr. Mendenhall’s criminal actions were
“aberrational” and “way out of character for him.” (Ex. 1, p.25, Ls.16-22.)
Based upon the police reports, the PSI writer described Mr. Mendenhall’s charges as
stemming from him repeatedly physically and emotionally abusing his 14-year-old stepson over
a month and a half period. (PSI, pp.33-35.)2 Mr. Mendenhall’s wife described him as being
“very paranoid about everything” and he even pointed a gun and himself, threatening to pull the
trigger in front of her. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Mendenhall told the PSI writer that a few months before
his crimes, he lost his job and he “started hearing voices in ‘manic stages.’” (PSI, p.38.)
Mr. Mendenhall started using what he believed was methamphetamine but later learned was bath
salts, he became “paranoid, confused, and angry,” had a “psychotic breakdown,” and he
convinced himself that his stepson was responsible for the problems Mr. Mendenhall was
having. (PSI, pp.35-38.) Although Mr. Mendenhall did not remember all of the times he abused
his stepson, he did remember striking him on multiple occasions and he expressed his remorse
for his actions. (PSI, pp.35-38.)
A licensed professional counselor with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
conducted a Global Assessment of Individual Needs (GAIN) for Mr. Mendenhall. (PSI, pp.7072.) The assessor provided AXIS I diagnoses including “Rule Out - Mood Disorder NOS,” and
“Rule Out – Generalized Anxiety Disorder.” (R., p.70.) The assessor noted that she was not a
“licensed mental health clinician,” and that “the term ‘rule out’ is commonly used by IDOC staff
or contracted GAIN assessors when the assessor is not licensed to diagnosis mental illness. The

2

The district court took judicial notice of relevant portions of the Presentence Investigation
Report and its attached documents that were created for Mr. Mendenhall’s sentencing hearing.
(R., p.110.) Citations to those exhibits will use the designation “PSI” and will include the page
number associated with the 628 page electronic file containing those documents.
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use of ‘rule out’ indicates that the diagnosis as generated by the GAIN, is provisional.”
(R., p.70.) The assessor further recognized that she “may not have access to all the information
regarding this defendant.” (R., p.70.)
Despite her admitted professional limitations, the assessor found indications that
Mr. Mendenhall suffered from a serious mental illness (SMI), based upon the fact that
Mr. Mendenhall reported he had previously been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and
Schizophrenia. (R., p.70.) Mr. Mendenhall informed the assessor that he was currently suffering
from mental health symptoms and that he was receiving treatment from the Ada County Jail
staff. (R., pp.70-71.) In addition to Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia, Mr. Mendenhall
informed the assessor that he had previously been diagnosed with anxiety disorder and
depression, and that he had previously undergone mental health treatment. (R., p.71.) The
assessor recommended that Mr. Mendenhall continue to get mental health treatment, but that no
additional mental health assessment was necessary. (R., p.71.)
After submitting the original PSI, including the GAIN assessment, the PSI writer
submitted an addendum containing records from Intermountain Hospital of four separate times
Mr. Mendenhall was hospitalized for mental health issues. (PSI, pp.2-30.)

These records

revealed that in 1993, at the age of 15, Mr. Mendenhall was hospitalized for a two-week period
after repeatedly expressing a desire to kill himself. (PSI, pp.17-22.) He was diagnosed with
major depression with suicidal ideation, suspected bipolar disorder, and ADHD by history. (PSI,
p.21.)

Eight months later, and after he had stopped regularly taking his medication,

Mr. Mendenhall again entered Intermountain Hospital.

(PSI, pp.23-29.)

He was again

diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and, after a three-week stay, he was transferred to the Idaho
Youth Ranch for further counseling. (PSI, p.27.) In 1996 at the age of 18, Mr. Mendenhall was
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again admitted to Intermountain Hospital, this time for one week, after he crashed his truck
during a hypomanic state, and he was again diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder. (PSI, pp.6-8, 1016.) Finally, in 2008 at the age of 30, Mr. Mendenhall checked himself in for an overnight stay
at Intermountain Hospital because he was suffering from increasing panic and anxiety, and he
was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder NOS, Polysubstance abuse in partial remission, and Panic
Disorder. (PSI, pp.5, 9, 30.) Even after getting all of the information about Mr. Mendenhall’s
history of mental illness, trial counsel did not file a new motion for the court to order a § 19-2522
evaluation prior to the sentencing hearing.
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor claimed that Mr. Mendenhall’s attempts to
take responsibility for his actions are filled with “minimizations, excuses, and delusions.”
(Ex. 1, p.32, Ls.16-24.) The prosecutor argued, “[t]he biggest untruth in all of this, Your Honor,
is when he says he isn’t a monster. And what he did to that child is the very definition of a
monster.” (Ex. 1, p.34, Ls.6-9.) Trial counsel pointed out that Mr. Mendenhall has a long
history of mental health issues and argued that Mr. Mendenhall’s crimes appear to be a result of
a psychotic break, and counsel asked that Mr. Mendenhall be “mentally evaluated” and put on
medication while serving his prison term, so “this type of break does not happen again . . .”
(Ex. 1, p.38, L.21 – p.43, L.22.) Mr. Mendenhall concluded his allocution by stating, “I love my
family deeply. And I have struggled with this illness my entire life. That doesn’t mean I am any
less accountable for it, but I ask you to please consider it.” (Ex. 1, p.47, Ls.12-15.)

In

pronouncing sentence, the district court did not mention Mr. Mendenhall’s history of mental
illness; instead, the court indicated it believed Mr. Mendenhall’s violent behaviors were caused
by his use of bath salts. (Ex. 1, p.48, L.4 – p.55, L.22.) The court sentenced Mr. Mendenhall to
a total unified term of 25 years, with 10 years fixed. (Ex. 1, p.53, L.22 – p.54, L.9.)

4

Mr. Mendenhall filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.5-28.)

Among his claims,3 Mr. Mendenhall asserted that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his attorney “failed to follow through and investigate mitigating
evidence,” by failing to obtain a psychological evaluation, as Mr. Mendenhall believed had been
ordered by the court prior to sentencing. (R., p.6.) Mr. Mendenhall claimed that both he and his
father had asked his trial counsel to obtain a “psych eval at pleading,” but his counsel later
“denied doing so and denied [Mr. Mendenhall] that [defense].” (R., p.7.) In his affidavit in
support of his petition, Mr. Mendenhall stated,
I was denied effective assistance of coun[sel] at sentencing when coun[sel] failed
to investigate mitigating evidence that [would] have [lessened] petitioner’s
responsibility and blame. Defen[s]e [counsel] was asked several times to
investigate mental health of petitioner. Where at pleadings he did so “only”
request an evaluation be done and was granted so by the judge. He then
pretended to have no knowledge of this at last moment[] though I insisted and
[he] instead claimed we would not need it!
(R., pp.10-11.) Mr. Mendenhall attached some records of his stays at Intermountain Hospital as
exhibits to his petition, and the district court granted his motion for the appointment of counsel.
(R., pp.12-28, 37-42.)
The State filed an Answer denying all of Mr. Mendenhall’s claims, a motion for summary
dismissal, and a brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal, which included transcripts
of the entry of plea and sentencing hearings as an exhibit.

(R., pp.63-93.)

Regarding

Mr. Mendenhall’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a pre-sentence

3

Mr. Mendenhall also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective in coercing him to plead guilty
by making false promises, knowing Mr. Mendenhall was under the influence of Suboxone, and
that the court lacked jurisdiction over his case, because the victim of his injury to a child was
over the age of 13. (R., pp.5-11.) Mr. Mendenhall did not oppose the State’s motion for
summary dismissal of any of these claims, and does not assert error in dismissing those claims in
this appeal. (R., p.97.)
5

mental health evaluation, the State argued Mr. Mendenhall’s claim was bare and conclusory, and
that he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (R., p.71.) Without citing to any
authority, the State argued that Mr. Mendenhall must prove the “contents of the psychological
exam would have applied to one of the sentencing factors the court was required to consider and
it would have resulted in a shorter sentence.” (PSI, p.72 (emphasis original).) Arguing he failed
to show either, the State moved to summarily dismiss this claim. Id.
Mr. Mendenhall’s post-conviction counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the
State’s motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.96-98.) Based in large part on the Court of
Appeals’ decision in Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1998), Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel
argued,
Given the lack of reports complying with section 19-2522, the trial court here was
not adequately equipped to address the issue of mental health as required under
section 19-2523, Idaho Code. Given Mr. Mendenhall’s past successful treatment,
there is a reasonable likelihood that a full psychological evaluation could have
provided mitigation to be used at sentencing; furthermore, Mr. Mendenhall’s
counsel was ineffective in his failure to provide such a report to the trial court at
sentencing.
Since there is a dispute of material fact as to whether
Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel[’]s representation was deficient in a way that had a
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case, summary dismissal is
inappropriate in this matter.
(R., pp.96-98.)
During a hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the State argued that,
because Mr. Mendenhall had not supported his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to obtain a § 19-2522 evaluation, with an actual § 19-2522 evaluation, the court should
summarily dismiss that claim.

(Tr., p.7, L.18 – p.11, L.25.)

The prosecutor suggested

Mr. Mendenhall could have obtained a psychological evaluation in support of his post-conviction
petition, but since he had as-of-yet failed to do so, summary dismissal was appropriate.
(Tr., p.12, L.1 – p.13, L.13.)

Counsel for Mr. Mendenhall argued that trial counsel was

6

ineffective in withdrawing his request for a § 19-2522 evaluation and instead acquiescing in the
court’s desire for a § 19-2524 evaluation, and that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to
determine whether trial counsel’s decision was strategic. (Tr., p.13, L.16 – p.28, L.11.) On
rebuttal, the State again argued that summary dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Mendenhall
had not yet produced an actual § 19-2522 evaluation. (Tr., p.28, L.18 – p.33, L.20.) The court
took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.33, L.22 – p.38, L.16.)
The district court issued a written order granting the State’s motion for summary
dismissal, and a judgment dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s petition. (R., pp.109-17.) The court
found that Mr. Mendenhall’s trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request a § 19-2522
evaluation, because counsel first asked for such an evaluation, but then later deferred to the
court’s decision to order a § 19-2524 evaluation only. (R., p.113.) Furthermore, the court found
Mr. Mendenhall failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because the
§ 19-2524 assessor concluded that no further evaluation was necessary. (R., p.113.) The court
noted that trial counsel argued Mr. Mendenhall’s mental health in mitigation and found no
deficient performance. (R., p.113.)
Additionally, the court found that, even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient,
Mr. Mendenhall was still required to show prejudice.

The court acquiesced to the State’s

prejudice analysis, finding Mr. Mendenhall was,
required to show reasonable probability that the outcome (sentence) would have
been different. To do that, if this matter were to go to an evidentiary hearing, he
would have to show that contents of the psychological exam would have applied
to one of the sentencing factors the court was required to consider and that it
would have resulted in a shorter sentence. This would require him to actually
produce the conclusions from such a psychological examination so the Court
could determine whether it would have made a difference in the final sentence.

7

(R., p.114.) The court noted that it had prior mental health evaluations at the time of sentencing,
and found that Mr. Mendenhall had not shown that, had there been an additional evaluation, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. (R., p.114.) The district court ultimately
held that, “[s]ince [Mr. Mendenhall] has failed to produce any evidence of what such a
psychological examination would have concluded, he has failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he was prejudiced.” (R., p.114.)
Mr. Mendenhall filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.118-20.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to obtain an Idaho Code § 19-2522 evaluation?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s Claim That His Counsel
Was Ineffective In Failing To Obtain An Idaho Code § 19-2522 Evaluation

A.

Introduction
Whenever there is reason to believe that mental condition will be a significant sentencing

factor, Idaho law requires the court to appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine and
report upon the defendant’s mental condition, if requested by the defendant. I.C. § 19-2522.
Prior to sentencing, the PSI writer provided the parties and the district court with information
indicating Mr. Mendenhall suffered from a serious mental illness, and that his illness played a
role in his criminal activity.

These reports, however, did not satisfy the requirements of

I.C. § 19-2522.
The evidence before the district court demonstrates that Mr. Mendenhall’s mental
condition was a significant factor at his sentencing, and that his trial counsel failed to obtain the
district court to order a § 19-2522 evaluation. The district court erred in finding trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient and in summarily dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s petition on this
basis. Additionally, Mr. Mendenhall asserts the lack of a § 19-2522 evaluation rendered his
sentencing hearing presumptively unreliable, and the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his post-conviction petition.

B.

Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a plaintiff

in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the requests for relief
are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008).
However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original post-conviction petition must allege

10

more than merely “a short and plain statement of the claim.” Id. at 443-44. The application
must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained
therein, or else the post-conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through postconviction proceedings. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that trial counsel’s
performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). Where a defendant shows that his counsel was
deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, at
694; Aragon at 760. “[I]neffective assistance of counsel during a sentencing hearing can result
in Strickland prejudice because ‘any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment
significance.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012) (quoting Glover v. United States, 531
U.S. 198, 203 (2001).) When a proceeding in question is “presumptively reliable,” a petitioner
must establish actual prejudice; however, prejudice will be presumed “when the violation of the
right to counsel rendered the proceeding presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent.”
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (citations omitted).
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the petition
and supporting evidence fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the
petitioner’s favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.
“A material fact has ‘some logical connection with the consequential facts[,]’ Black’s Law
Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties.” Id. On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief

11

application without an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, together with any
affidavits on file. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). The underlying facts
alleged by the petitioner “must be regarded as true” for purposes of summary dismissal.
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the
non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).

C.

The Evidence Before The Court Demonstrates That Trial Counsel Was Constitutionally
Deficient In Failing To Obtain A Mental Health Evaluation Pursuant To Idaho
Code § 19-2522 Prior To Sentencing, And The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s Petition On This Basis
The district court found that Mr. Mendenhall’s trial counsel was not deficient because he

initially asked the district court to order an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, but the court
instead decided to order only a § 19-2524 assessment. (R., p.113.) The court noted that the
assessor who completed the § 19-2524 assessment concluded that, “no additional mental health
assessment is necessary,” and the court reasoned that Mr. Mendenhall failed to explain how his
trial counsel’s failure to continue to argue for a § 19-2522 evaluation would be constitutionally
deficient. (R., p.113.) The district court’s ruling is factually and legally incorrect.

1.

Mr. Mendenhall’s Counsel Abandoned His Request For An Idaho Code § 192522 Evaluation And Instead Acquiesced In The District Court’s Order For An
Idaho Code § 19-2524 Evaluation, Inviting The District Court’s Error And
Depriving Mr. Mendenhall The Right To Seek Redress Through Direct Appeal

The district court’s finding that Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel was not ineffective because he
initially requested an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, is mistaken. After the district court
accepted Mr. Mendenhall’s guilty plea (Ex. 1, p.23, Ls.1-5), the following exchange occurred:

12

MR. SCHILD (defense counsel): I would like the – the evaluation, to benefit the
Court, to include a 19-2522 exam in light of his bipolar condition and the anxiety
disorder. And I think that information will be helpful to the Court.
THE COURT: When was he diagnosed; do you know, Mr. Schild?
MR. SCHILD: As a teenager. It’s been kind of a lifelong deal.
THE COURT: Have you had a recent hospitalization, Mr. Mendenhall?
[MR. MENDENHALL]: At the age of 29, I believe.
THE COURT: And how long ago was that?
[MR. MENDENHALL]: It was approximately eight years ago.
THE COURT: Okay. So I was going to say, if there has been a recent
hospitalization, it probably wouldn’t matter. And you don’t believe a 19-2524
would be adequate, Mr. Schild?
MR. SCHILD: It probably would.
THE COURT: Well, there is a difference. A 19-2524 is essentially a screening
done based off of the GAIN –
MR. SCHILD: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: -- by a licensed professional.
MR. SCHILD: Sure.
THE COURT: A 19-2522 is done by at least a master’s level psychologist. So …
MR. SCHILD: I would defer to the Court on what level of screening you think
would be most helpful to you for sentencing.
THE COURT: What I am inclined to do is review the 19-2524, and, if it
recommends further evaluation, we will take it up from there.
MR. SCHILD: That would be wonderful.
THE COURT: That is part of what it’s supposed to do as part of the 19-2524 is
advise the Court whether further assessment and evaluation is necessary.
MR. SCHILD: I think that – I think that would be good because, from the
defense perspective, this was an aberrational occurrence. And I’m not, you know,
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speaking to justify any – anything of what was done, but it was certainly way out
of character for him. And with his history, I’d like the Court to have that
information.
(Ex. 1, p.24, L.2 – p.25, L.22.) This exchange demonstrates that while Mr. Mendenhall’s
counsel initially asked for a § 19-2522 evaluation, counsel immediately abandoned that request
when the court indicated that it was inclined to order a § 19-2524 assessment. “‘It has long been
the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or
invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.’” State v. Lankford,
162 Idaho 477, 484–85 (2017) (quoting State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35
(2013)) (further citations omitted). By agreeing that a § 19-2524 evaluation would be sufficient
and “wonderful,” Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel effectively withdrew his request for a § 19-2522
evaluation. 4
The record establishes that Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel acquiesced in the district court’s
failure to order an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522.

The court’s finding that

Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel could not be deficient because he initially requested a § 19-2522
evaluation is erroneous.

4

During the hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court suggested the
possibility that Mr. Mendenhall’s claim might be precluded by I.C. § 19-4901(b), reasoning that
he could have argued the court erred in failing to order a § 19-2522 evaluation on direct appeal.
(See generally, Tr.) The court ultimately did not dismiss this claim on this ground and for good
reason – the invited error doctrine would have precluded Mr. Mendenhall from raising this claim,
had he appealed from his judgment of conviction. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at 484–85.
Additionally, Mr. Mendenhall would not have been able to raise the district court’s failure to sua
sponte order a § 19-2522 evaluation as fundamental error. See State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170
(2013).
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2.

In Light Of The Information Known About Mr. Mendenhall’s Mental Condition
At The Time Of Sentencing, The District Court Would Have Been Required To
Grant A Motion For An Idaho Code § 19-2522 Evaluation

Even if Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel was not deficient by acquiescing in the district court’s
initial decision to decline to order a § 19-2524 assessment instead of a § 19-2522 evaluation,
counsel was deficient in failing to request a § 19-2522 evaluation after receiving the GAIN
assessment and the hospital records. Had counsel made such a request, well-established Idaho
precedent would have required the district court to order a § 19-2522 evaluation.
Idaho Code § 19-2522 states that, “If there is reason to believe the mental condition of
the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall
appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the
mental condition of the defendant.” I.C. § 19-2522(1). “Evidence of mental condition shall be
received, if offered, at the time of sentencing of any person convicted of a crime.” I.C. § 192523. “The defendant’s mental condition is a significant factor at sentencing if the sentencing
court is aware of a defendant's lengthy history of serious mental illness.” State v. Hanson, 152
Idaho 314, 319–20 (2012).
After reviewing all of the PSI materials, including the GAIN assessment and
Mr. Mendenhall’s hospital records, the district court was aware that Mr. Mendenhall suffered
from a serious mental illness and that his mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing. At the time of sentencing, the district court was aware that, during the time period in
which he committed his criminal acts, Mr. Mendenhall was being “very paranoid about
everything” and had threatened to kill himself, that he “started hearing voices in ‘manic stages,’”
and that he became “paranoid, confused, and angry,” and had a “psychotic breakdown.” (PSI,
pp.34-38.) The court had multiple reports from Intermountain Hospital demonstrating that
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Mr. Mendenhall had been hospitalized on four separate occasions due to his mental illness. (PSI,
pp.2-30.) The court was aware that Mr. Mendenhall had been previously diagnosed with Bipolar
Disorder, Schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, and depression, that he had previously undergone
mental health treatment, and that he was currently suffering mental health symptoms and was
receiving treatment in the jail. (R., pp.70-71; PSI, pp.2-30.)
The court was also aware that the mental health assessor provided AXIS I diagnoses
including “Rule Out - Mood Disorder NOS,” and “Rule Out – Generalized Anxiety Disorder,”
but that the assessor was not qualified or licensed to make any actual diagnoses. (R., pp.70-71.)
The assessor found indications that Mr. Mendenhall suffered from a serious mental illness
(SMI), based upon the fact that Mr. Mendenhall reported he had previously been diagnosed with
Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia. (R., p.70.) Additionally, the assessor recommended that
Mr. Mendenhall continue to get mental health treatment; however, for reasons unknown, the
assessor opined that no additional mental health assessment was necessary. (R., p.71.)
In State v. Black, 161 Idaho 867 (Ct. App. 2017), the Court of Appeals found the district
court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s pre-sentence request for an I.C. § 192522 evaluation. After pleading guilty to criminal possession of a financial transaction card,
Black told the PSI writer that he considered his mental health issues to be “serious,” as he had
prior diagnoses of anxiety, depression, and Bipolar disorder, had attempted suicide in the past,
and he told the PSI writer that he wanted a further assessment. Id. at 868-69. A GAIN
assessment was conducted and Black’s answers “suggested the presence of several clinical
disorders including bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, recurrent major depressive
disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).” Id. at 869. A counselor with the
Department of Health And Welfare prepared a § 19-2524 evaluation acknowledging, “Black may
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have a serious mental illness,” but stated, “because Black was currently receiving mental health
treatment through the jail, no additional mental health treatment or assessments were
recommended.” Id. The district court denied Black’s motion for a § 19-2522 evaluation finding
that Black had failed to show good cause for the evaluation, and that there was no reason to
believe Black’s mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing. Id.
The Black Court found that the facts known to the district court demonstrated that there
was sufficient reason to believe Black’s mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing, and thus abused its discretion by denying Black’s request for a § 19-2522 evaluation.
Id. at 870-72.

Although Mr. Mendenhall’s case arises through post-conviction, the Black

opinion demonstrates that trial counsel’s performance was presumptively deficient. Like Black,
the district court and Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel were aware that Mr. Mendenhall suffered from
anxiety, Bipolar disorder, and had attempted suicide. (R., pp.70-71; PSI, pp.2-30.) Unlike in
Black, Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel did not request a § 19-2522 evaluation. (Ex. 1, p.24, L.2 –
p.25, L.22; p.27, L.4 – p.56, L.3.) Had Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel requested a § 19-2522
evaluation, the district court would have abused its discretion if it denied such a request, as the
Court of Appeals found Black’s counsel to have done.
Additionally, in Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1998), the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s order summarily dismissing the petitioner’s claim that her counsel
was ineffective in failing to present evidence of her mental illness at sentencing. Vick had a long
history of mental illness and treatment and she asserted “that although trial counsel raised her
mental illness as an issue at sentencing, he failed to provide the sentencing court with a fully
completed psychological evaluation” resulting in the court inadequately considering her mental
illness as a mitigating factor. Id. at 123-24.
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The Court of Appeals found that evidence of the defendant’s mental condition submitted
to the trial court prior to sentencing, including a report by a forensic psychiatrist who interviewed
the defendant on multiple occasions, did not address the criteria mandated by I.C. §§ 19-2522
and 19-2523. Id. at 123-25. Despite the fact the district court stated that it took Vick’s mental
condition into consideration, the Court of Appeals found that summary dismissal of the claim
was error because there was additional information about Vick’s history of mental illness and
treatment available that defense counsel did not submit to the court. Id. at 125-26. The Vick
Court held,
Vick’s application, supported by documentation, raises material issues of fact as
to whether she received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing because
her attorney did not request or provide a report satisfying the requirements
of I.C. § 19-2522, did not object to the imposition of sentence without the benefit
of such a report, and did not submit other readily available psychological
information that provided a more favorable assessment and prognosis.
Id. at 126. As in Vick, Mr. Mendenhall’s trial counsel failed to request the district court to order
a § 19-2522 evaluation, after discovering an abundance of information showing that
Mr. Mendenhall’s mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing, nor did counsel
object to the district court proceeding to sentencing without obtaining such an evaluation. (Ex. 1,
p.24, L.2 – p.25, L.22; p.27, L.4 – p.56, L.3.)
In sum, both Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel and the district court had an abundance of
information indicating Mr. Mendenhall’s mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing. Had defense counsel made such a request after all of this information was presented
to the court, but before sentence was imposed, the district court would have abused its discretion
if it denied a request for a § 19-2522 evaluation.
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3.

The Information Contained In The PSI Did Not Meet The Requirements Of Idaho
Code § 19-2522, And The GAIN Assessor’s Recommendation For No Further
Evaluation Does Not Excuse Mr. Mendenhall’s Counsel’s Deficient Performance

To the extent the district court found that Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel was not deficient
because the court had some information about Mr. Mendenhall’s mental condition and defense
counsel argued such during the sentencing hearing, the district court’s holding is in error. Idaho
Code § 19-2522(6) allows the district court to forgo ordering an evaluation, even where a
defendant’s mental condition will be a significant factor at sentencing, under certain
circumstances.
If a mental health examination of the defendant has previously been conducted,
whether pursuant to section 19-2524, Idaho Code, or for any other purpose, and a
report of such examination has been submitted to the court, and if the court
determines that such examination and report provide the necessary information
required in subsection (3) of this section, and the examination is sufficiently
recent to reflect the defendant’s present mental condition, then the court may
consider such prior examination and report as the examination and report required
by this section and need not order an additional examination of the defendant’s
mental condition.
I.C. § 19-2522(6). The requirements listed in subsection (3) are as follows,
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant’s illness or defect and level of
functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant’s mental
condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create for the
public if at large.
I.C. § 19-2522(3). For multiple reasons, the evaluation submitted to the district court simply did
not meet these requirements.
Most notably, the evaluation did not contain a “diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis” of
Mr. Mendenhall’s mental condition. (PSI, pp.70-71.) This is understandable considering the

19

assessor does not have the education or training level to enable her to make such a diagnosis. Id.
The assessor recognized the answers Mr. Mendenhall gave during the test she administered
showed that he had a serious mental illness, and she provided “rule out” diagnoses Mood
Disorder NOS, and Generalized Anxiety disorder.

Id.

The inability to diagnosis

Mr. Mendenhall made it both practically and legally impossible for the assessor provide an
analysis as to whether treatment was available to Mr. Mendenhall, the risks and benefits of such
treatment or non-treatment, and the risk of danger Mr. Mendenhall may create for the public at
large. (PSI, pp.70-72.) Instead, the assessor simply checked a box stating, “Continue mental
health treatment with current provided and/or another provider.”5 (PSI, p.71.) This information
is simply insufficient to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).
The Black Court recognized that, “not every mental health evaluation conforms with the
exacting requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).” Black, 161 Idaho at 871 (citations omitted). Like
the mental health evaluations found to be insufficient in Black, the GAIN assessment and the
documentation of Mr. Mendenhall’s 1994, 1994, 1996, and 2008, hospitalizations, were enough
to show the court that a § 19-2522 evaluation was required, but not enough to meet the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). See PSI, pp.2-30; see also Hanson, 152 Idaho at 324-25
(rejecting the State’s argument that the district court’s failure to order a § 19-2522 evaluation
was harmless because the court recommended the defendant receive a psychological evaluation
while incarcerated.)
Furthermore, to the extent the district court found that Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel was not
deficient in failing to request a § 19-2522 evaluation because the GAIN assessor indicated “no

5

The assessor, of course, should not be faulted for providing the report she was tasked with
providing.
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additional mental health assessment is necessary,” such a finding is erroneous. Idaho Code § 192522(6) makes it clear that attorneys and courts may not defer to the wisdom of a social worker,
and must instead retain the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist whenever there is reason to
believe that a defendant’s mental condition will be a significant factor at sentencing, and the
information before the court is insufficient to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). The
assessor’s conclusion that no further evaluation of Mr. Mendenhall was necessary did not relieve
Mr. Mendenhall’s counsel of his duty to request the court order a § 19-2522 evaluation.

4.

Arguing The Court Should Consider Mr. Mendenhall’s Mental Condition In
Mitigation And Asking The Court To Recommend The Department Of Correction
Provide Mr. Mendenhall Treatment Did Not Absolve Mr. Mendenhall’s
Counsel’s Deficient Performance

Mr. Mendenhall’s Counsel’s argument to the district court that it should consider his
mental health in mitigation, and his request that the court recommend treatment, did not allay
defense counsel’s failure to request a § 19-2522 evaluation. As noted above, Idaho law requires
the sentencing court to order a § 19-2522 evaluation whenever there is reason to believe a
defendant’s mental condition will be a significant factor at sentencing.

Mr. Mendenhall’s

counsel did not make up for his deficient performance by asking the district court to recommend
Mr. Mendenhall receive treatment in prison. See e.g. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 324-25 (rejecting the
State’s argument that the district court’s failure to order a § 19-2522 evaluation was harmless
because the court recommended the defendant receive a psychological evaluation while
incarcerated).
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5.

There Is A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Mendenhall’s
Counsel Made A Constitutionally Sound Strategic Decision Not To Request A
§ 19-2522 Evaluation

Mr.

Mendenhall’s

post-conviction

counsel

conceded

the

possibility

that

Mr. Mendenhall’s trial counsel made a tactical decision not to request a § 19-2522 evaluation
prior to sentencing. (Tr., p.25, L.21 – p.28, L.8.) Mr. Mendenhall thus asks this Court to remand
his case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

D.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mendenhall’s Petition Based
Upon Its Finding That Mr. Mendenhall Failed To Present Evidence That He Was
Prejudiced By His Counsel’s Failure To Obtain An Idaho Code § 19-2522 Evaluation
Parroting language used by the State in its motion for summary dismissal (see R., pp.71-

72), the district court held the following,
Even if we assume the performance of counsel was deficient, the second
prong of Strickland requires evidence the Petitioner was prejudiced. This means
he is required to show reasonable probability that the outcome (sentence) would
have been different. To do that, if this matter were to go to an evidentiary
hearing, he would have to show that contents of the psychological exam would
have applied to one of the sentencing factors the court was required to consider
and that it would have resulted in a shorter sentence. This would require him to
actually produce the conclusions from such a psychological examination so the
Court could determine whether it would have made a difference in the final
sentence. The Addendum to Presentence Report contained records from
Mr. Mendenhall’s earlier hospitalizations. These are the same records as were
attached to the affidavit in Support of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that another evaluation, if done at the time of
sentencing, would have produced any new or different evidence, let alone that the
evidence would be sufficient to raise a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different. Since he has failed to produce any
evidence of what such a psychological examination would have concluded, he has
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced.
(R., p.114.) Mr. Mendenhall asserts the district court applied the wrong prejudice analysis.
As noted above, where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is
shown if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
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of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Aragon 114 Idaho at
760. The district court apparently assumed that, in order for Mr. Mendenhall to show prejudice,
he would have to produce a § 19-2522 evaluation that would have resulted in him receiving a
less-severe sentence, had it been presented to the court prior to that court imposing sentence.
Mr. Mendenhall asserts this is incorrect.
The year after Strickland was decided, the Supreme Court sought to apply Strickland’s
prejudice prong to a case where the petitioner claimed his guilty plea was rendered involuntary
due to his counsel’s false advice about when the petitioner would be eligible for parole. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1985). The Court ruled as follows:
We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In the
context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is
nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already
set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)], and McMann v.
Richardson, [397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)]. The second, or “prejudice,”
requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally
ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words,
in order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Id. at 58-59. The Hill Court did not require the petitioner to prove he would have prevailed at
trial; rather, the petitioner was only required to show that he would have exercised his right to
trial.
This concept was expanded upon by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470 (2000). The Roe Court held “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made
out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” Id. at 484.
In order to make out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal
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claim, a petitioner is not required to “demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had
merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially
meritorious grounds for appeal. Rather, we require the defendant to demonstrate that, but for
counsel’s deficient conduct, he would have appealed.” Id. at 486. The Roe Court held that
prejudice would be presumed when “the violation of the right to counsel rendered the proceeding
presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
Mr. Mendenhall asserts that his sentencing hearing was presumptively unreliable due to
the lack of a § 19-2522 evaluation.

As noted above, the language of I.C. § 19-2522 is

mandatory, requiring a court to order an mental health evaluation to be conducted by a
psychiatrist or psychologist whenever there is reason to believe the defendant’s mental condition
will be a significant factor at sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 319. Idaho Code § 19-2522
evaluations serve two purposes: one, to provide the court with information about the defendant
to be weighed in determining the appropriate punishment; and two, “‘to assist the district court at
sentencing in determining whether to recommend psychological treatment under section 19-2523
during a defendant’s confinement or probation.’” Id. at 323 (quoting State v. Harper, 129 Idaho
86, 91 (1996)). The erroneous failure to order a § 19-2522 evaluation when requested by the
defendant, cannot be found harmless.

“In view of this unambiguous expression by our

Legislature that sentencing courts are to obtain and consider evidence of the defendant’s mental
condition, we are unable to find that the failure to do so in this case is harmless error.” Id. at
325.
Due to his counsel’s deficient performance in failing to request the district court to order
a § 19-2522 evaluation, Mr. Mendenhall was deprived his right to have the information
contained therein considered by the district court. As such, he asserts that his sentencing hearing
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was presumptively unreliable and the district court erred in finding he had failed to show that he
was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance.
Even if his sentencing hearing was not presumptively unreliable, Mr. Mendenhall asserts
the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing this claim, as there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to obtain a § 192522 evaluation. In Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190 (Ct. App. 2002), the Idaho Court of
Appeals recognized that it had previously found the district court’s summary dismissal of the
petitioner’s “claim that his mental illness constituted a mitigating circumstance that trial counsel
should have raised at sentencing was improper.” Id. at 192 (citing Richman v. State, 136 Idaho
457 (Ct. App. 2001) (unpublished opinion)). The Richman Court held, “the purpose of this
Court’s remand after Richman’s first appeal from the denial of his application for postconviction relief was to afford Richman an opportunity to present evidence in support of his
position that the district court should reconsider the sentences original imposed.” Id. at 194. The
Court ultimately held that Richman did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced, due to the
district court’s finding that the sentence would not have been different had all of the information
about Richman’s mental condition been submitted prior to sentencing. Id.
Mr. Mendenhall maintains that his sentencing hearing was presumptively unreliable and
he has thus demonstrated prejudice, due to his counsel’s failure to request a § 19-2522
evaluation.

However, to the extent the Richman opinion accurately states Idaho law,

Mr. Mendenhall asserts there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure, and the district court erred in granting the State’s motion for
summary dismissal.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Mendenhall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order and
judgment summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition, and remand his case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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